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Nil Filing in Eswatini: Should the Revenue Administration Be Concerned? 
 
Fabrizio Santoro and Winnie Mdluli 
 
 
Summary 
 
The tax-to-GDP ratio in developing countries is still remarkably low for many different 
reasons. One of the key factors behind poor tax collection is low tax compliance. In this 
paper we look at compliance with income tax in Eswatini, focusing on one particular 
dimension – filing of nil returns. Nil-filing represents a sizeable share of returns in many 
African countries. However, it is largely unexplored in the literature and disregarded by tax 
agencies, who are more interested in declarations yielding a positive return. For these 
reasons, we attempt to fill the gap by mapping nil-filing in Eswatini using anonymised 
administrative data provided by the Swaziland Revenue Authority (SRA).  
 
First, we show that over a period of five years about 30 per cent of corporate income tax 
(CIT) returns are nil every year. This translates into 45 per cent of taxpayers nil-filing in at 
least one year over the five-year period. Moreover, nil-filing varies a lot within categories of 
firms: it is much more likely to take place in certain districts and sectors in Eswatini, and is 
more common for small and younger firms. At the same time, persistent nil-filing is also very 
common. We also cross-check CIT data with value added tax (VAT) and Pay As You Earn 
(PAYE) data to monitor the filing behaviour of nil-filers across different tax returns, finding 
some extent of misreporting – probably due to evasion. After describing the results, we 
analyse additional qualitative data and provide recommendations for future research. 
 
Keywords: tax compliance; income tax; tax administration. 
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Introduction 
 
As information technology (IT) continues to evolve, tax administrations are realising the 
importance of learning from the vast amount of data extracted from their revenue 
management systems. The information contained in the authority’s data could help create 
factual evidence and inform policymaking. It is difficult to imagine a modern tax 
administration that can successfully achieve given revenue targets and implement a sound 
tax strategy without efficiently managing its IT system. On a daily basis, massive amounts of 
taxpayers’ data are captured from source documents, such as physical income tax returns. In 
addition to being used for administrative purposes, it is important that this information is 
gathered and interpreted to provide a basis for making informed policy decisions, or 
implementing transformational ideas to improve compliance.  
 
There are many advantages of using administrative data (Mascagni et al. 2016). First, it 
captures actual filing behaviour as opposed to the self-reported willingness to comply that is 
collected with survey tools – which is often biased and not representative.1 Second, the 
availability of tax returns across many years offers the opportunity to study trends in 
compliance over time, and to have a more comprehensive view of compliance patterns. 
Third, the analysis of administrative data could benefit from collaboration between revenue 
authorities and international development partners, a partnership that is pivotal to building 
capacity in the authority and embedding research as a key strategic component. In many 
high-income countries anonymised tax returns data has been released to researchers for a 
variety of studies, including field experiments to improve tax compliance (Mascagni 2018). At 
the same time, some revenue authorities in the African continent, such as agencies in 
Rwanda, Uganda and Ethiopia, have only recently inaugurated a collaboration with 
researchers, and provided them access to administrative data for research purposes.2 Based 
on that data, rigorous experiments and impact studies have recently been published, thus 
supporting the growing wave of evidence-based tax research in Africa and the developing 
world.3 
 
Another relevant fact in tax administrations is that revenue authorities are known to be more 
interested in those declarations that yield a positive revenue base than those that do not. 
This is not surprising in a context of underperforming tax collection and limited enforcement 
resources available to meet revenue targets. It has resulted in very little effort among tax 
authorities having been dedicated to further interrogating those declarations that do not 
contribute fiscal revenue.4 These declarations come from taxpayers that we call nil-filers. Nil-
filers are identified as taxpayers that regularly file their declaration, but indicate zero turnover, 
zero taxable income and zero tax payable for a given fiscal year, often repeating this 
behaviour over time. Nil-filing belongs to an often untapped space that tax authorities tend to 
ignore, even if it implies a possible alarming pattern of low compliance. Moreover, nil-filing is 
a largely unexplored topic in the tax research literature. Almost no evidence exists on why 
this phenomenon takes place, its key explanatory factors and which strategies are more 
effective in addressing it. 
                                                          
1  It is difficult to survey wealthy people to detect tax compliance (Atkinson et al. 2010; Alvaredo and Atkinson 2010; 
Atkinson 2011; Higgins and Lustig 2013). 
2  ICTD has been a key research partner with the Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA), Ethiopian Revenues and Customs 
Authority (ERCA) and Uganda Revenue Authority (URA), among others. 
3  Relevant studies from Africa include Mascagni and Mengistu (2016, 2018), Mascagni et al. (2017), Mascagni et al. 
(2019a), Almunia et al. (2017), Eissa et al. (2014, 2017) and Steenbergen (2017). Other field experiments using 
different tax returns from other developing context include: VAT payments in Chile (Pomeranz 2015), individual 
municipal taxes in Argentina (Castro and Scartascini 2015), firm taxes in Ecuador (Carrillo et al. 2017) and corporate 
income tax in Uruguay (Bergolo et al. 2018).  
4  We support this statement for two major reasons. First, there is no available empirical evidence studying nil-filing. 
Second, more importantly, informal discussions with staff from different revenue authorities in Africa, all from the ICTD 
research network, led to this conclusion. In order to shed more light on nil-filing, we had several interactions with SRA 
staff that further strengthened this view. 
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For these reasons, we set out to address two key questions. First, from a research 
perspective, how much nil-filing takes place in Eswatini, and what does the average nil-filing 
company look like? Second, from a policy perspective, how well does the revenue authority 
understand the way taxpayers are declaring their company income, and what can be done to 
improve this? 
 
Against this background, the aim of this paper is to fill the knowledge gap about nil-filing, and 
measure the extent of nil-filers with company income tax (CIT) in Eswatini. Additionally, this 
paper produces a descriptive overview of a nil-filer, focusing on the heterogeneity across 
geographical location, sectors and firm’s size. It also exploits alternative data sources, such 
as VAT and PAYE returns data, to cross-check the filing behaviour of nil-filers across 
different declarations, and measure the extent of misreporting information to the tax 
authority. Thanks to collaboration between the Swaziland Revenue Authority (SRA) and 
ICTD, the authors were able to analyse administrative data on CIT for a period of five fiscal 
years (2013-2017).5 Anonymous information on all key variables of income tax returns is 
observable. This data is used to identify and map nil-filing across the registered companies 
all over the country. This paper provides only descriptive results, and can be considered as 
the starting point of a long-term plan of research in the country. The lessons learned from 
this exercise are particularly relevant for policy in a context of weak fiscal capacity, low tax 
morale and large informality, as in Eswatini. For many different structual reasons, fostering 
tax compliance is much harder for revenue authorities in Africa, in particular, as well as in 
other developing countries (Besley and Persson 2014). This paper aims to start a debate on 
which strategies can be tested to cost-effectively promote a sound culture of taxpaying. 
Building on the evidence reported here, the implementing partners are planning to pilot 
different strategies targeting nil-filers, as well as other types of non-compliant taxpayers. 
Their effectiveness will be estimated with a rigorous comprehensive field experiment.  
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1 contextualises our study, 
providing a clear picture of taxation in Eswatini. Section 2 introduces the issue of nil-filing, 
discussing the existing evidence on it from different developing countries. Section 3 reports 
the descriptive results on nil-filing from the main analysis of tax returns data. The extent of 
nil-filing companies is measured and analysed across key taxpayer characteristics in order to 
detect any heterogeneity in this behaviour. Section 4 provides further checks on nil-filers by 
using additional returns data from VAT and PAYE returns. Section 5 looks at additional 
qualitative evidence on nil-filing. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
1  Context: tax system in Eswatini  
 
1.1 Country overview 
 
The Kingdom of Eswatini6 is a landlocked country in Southern Africa, bordered 
by Mozambique to the north-east and South Africa to the north, west and south. Eswatini is 
a developing country with a small economy, and is classified as a lower-middle income 
country with a GDP per capita of $3,243 (2017).7 Its main local trading partner is South 
Africa, and the countries’ currency, the Lilangeni (SZL), is pegged to the South African 
Rand.8 Economic growth is estimated to have declined to 1.9 per cent in 2017 from 3.2 per 
                                                          
5  The official fiscal year of assessment for SRA starts on 1 July and ends on 30 June. 
6  Formerly known as Swaziland. The name change took place in April 2018. While in most places the paper reflects this 
change, several documents and reports issued prior to this change still make reference to Swaziland. The revenue 
authority is still called Swaziland Revenue Authority. 
7  Source: World Bank World Development Indicators. 
8  Eswatini is a member in the following regional trade blocs: Southern African Customs Union (SACU), Common Market 
for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union 
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cent in 2016.9 The country also faces major development challenges. Based on the 
international poverty line of $1.90 a day, and lower middle income poverty line of $3.20 a 
day, it is estimated that 38 per cent of the Swazi population live in extreme poverty, and a 
total of 60.3 per cent are poor overall. This is accompanied by a high unemployment rate of 
23 per cent in 2018. Health issues are difficult to address, with HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis 
widespread in the country.10 As of 2018, Eswatini has the twelfth lowest life expectancy in the 
world, at 58 years.11 The present population growth rate is 1.2 per cent, with a total 
population of 1.4 million people in 2018.12 
 
1.2 Tax system in Eswatini 
 
SRA is a semi-autonomous institution established by the Revenue Authority Act in 2008, as 
part of the government’s reform strategy for revenue administration. SRA officially took over 
the function of revenue collection on 1 January 2011. Over the past seven years SRA has 
focused on improving operations, customer services and overall efficiency in the collection of 
revenue.  
 
SRA collects both direct and indirect taxes. The main direct income taxes are personal 
income tax (PIT), corporate income tax (CIT) and PAYE. The main indirect taxes are VAT 
and fuel taxes. PIT is a tax on income generated by individuals, and has a progressive 
structure – a maximum marginal rate of 33 per cent and exemptions for income below 
SZL41,000 ($2,848). CIT is levied at a standard rate of 27.5 per cent, and imposed on 
taxable income from corporate business activities.13 The VAT rate is 15 per cent.14  
 
In terms of filing obligations and deadlines, income tax returns must be submitted according 
to a staggered timeline. Non-VAT-registered small and medium enterprises are expected to 
furnish their returns by 31 October each year, individuals have to file by 30 November, and 
large companies and VAT registered entities must submit their returns by 31 December.15 
The tax year ends on 30 June. Every registered taxpayer is required to file their return 
regardless of whether they were operative during the year. Strict sanctions are imposed by 
law for failure to file and for false assessment. According to Income Tax Order (1975), 
anyone who fails to furnish a return within the stipulated period may be liable on conviction to 
a fine of SZL10,000 ($719) and/or imprisonment for a period of up to one year. Those 
making false assessments with an intention to evade are liable to a fine of SZL50,000 
($3,591) or imprisonment up to five years. 
 
1.3 Tax performance 
 
Since the inception of the SRA, revenue collection has continued to show a steady increase 
year on year. A growth of 8 per cent was recorded in 2017/18, compared to an average of 13 
per cent over the past five years, as indicated in Appendix Figure A1 (SRA 2018).16 Total 
revenue collection amounted to SZL8.453 billion ($617 million) in 2017/18. In terms of tax-to-
                                                          
(AU). The country’s major trading partners overseas are the United States and the European Union. Internationally, 
Eswatini is also a member of the Commonwealth of Nations and the United Nations. 
9  As reported by the World Bank <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/eswatini/overview (accessed 30 November 
2018)>.  
10  It is estimated that 26% of the adult population is HIV-positive. 
11  The population of Eswatini is fairly young - a median age of 20.5 years, and people aged 14 years or younger constitute 
37.5% of the country's total population. 
12  As per footnote 9 above. 
13  Taxable entities include companies, whether incorporated or not, as well as foreign-incorporated entities of a similar 
nature, whether resident or non-resident; permanent establishments of non-residents; trusts and partnerships. Some 
entities are exempted from CIT; exemptions must be authorised by SRA’s Commissioner General. 
14  The VAT rate increased from 14% in August 2018. 
15  This last group is expected to self-assess its liabilities online. This new deadline has been implemented since 2017. 
16  The reduced growth rate in 2017/2018 reflects the slow economic growth observed in the domestic economy in recent 
years and the fiscal challenges faced by the government, which is a major driver of the economy (SRA 2018).  
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GDP ratio, the country registers a positive trend – from 12.3 per cent in 2011/12 to 14.7 per 
cent in 2017/18, a figure that is in line with other African and low-income countries. More 
importantly, Eswatini collects proportionally much more income tax than other African 
countries. Income taxes account for more than half (57 per cent) of total revenue collected in 
2017/2018.17 VAT is also a major component, accounting for 30 per cent of the total.  
 
SRA (2018) reports 53,208 registered taxpayers in 2017/2018. This represents a 6.9 per cent 
increase from the 49,793 taxpayers registered in 2016/2017. Taxpayers registered for 
income tax account for 83 per cent of the total tax base. The positive trend in registrations 
reflects the success of SRA’s strategy in fostering formality, as well as other service-oriented 
initiatives.18 However, the informal sector still represents about 41 per cent of Eswatini 
national income.19 Although the most recent estimate of informality is ten years old, and it 
may have reduced, it still means that a sizeable share of the economy is under the agency’s 
radar. Informal activities are not captured by the administrative data analysed in this study. 
 
For this paper, it is important to understand the importance of income taxes in the country. 
Individual income tax accounts for 36 per cent of total revenue, being the largest tax 
component. This is followed by CIT, the focus of this study, which accounts for 16 per cent of 
the total. While in 2017/2018 individual income tax performed 13 per cent above target, CIT 
lagged behind, witnessing a 14 per cent below-target performance. Poor collection of CIT is 
mainly ascribed to reduced payments from major sectors during this period, particularly 
information and communication, financial services and manufacturing.  
 
Appendix Table A1 illustrates how the relative contribution of corporate tax revenue has been 
on a downward trend since 2014/2015.20 Against this background, this study is especially 
policy-relevant in the way it tries to understand and measure compliance issues with 
corporate income tax.  
 
 
2  Who are the nil-filers?  
 
Generally speaking, a nil-filer is a taxpayer that files a tax return, thus abiding by the law, but 
reports zero business income and zero income tax.21 In principle, they are different from 
taxpayers declaring zero tax due to losses, which are expected in any economy, since they 
do not report a negative taxable income, but a nil one. A large number of nil-filers implies that 
no revenue is raised by the authority, and it is then important to understand the rationale 
behind this behaviour. Nil-filing has also been found to be an important issue in other African 
countries. In Uganda, for example, nil-filers for VAT in 2012-2015 are 15 per cent of the total 
(Almunia et al. 2017). In Ethiopia, they amount to 23 per cent of all business profit tax returns 
lodged from 2006 to 2014 (Mascagni and Mengitsu 2016). In Rwanda, nil-filers seem to be 
even more widespread: in a study of nil-filers in income tax, Mascagni et al. (2019a) find that 
the average rate of corporate tax nil-filing is 56 per cent in fiscal years 2015-2017. At the 
same time, nil-filing is a smaller issue for personal income taxpayers (sole traders, self-
                                                          
17  Income taxes have also been the main contributor to revenue growth over the period 2013/14-2017/18 (SRA 2018). 
18  A noteworthy example of this approach is given by ‘Operation Bakhumbute’. This was a door-to-door compliance 
campaign, which aimed to increase the taxpayer base and remind taxpayers of their tax obligations. The operation was 
carried out on 733 businesses in the Lubombo, Shiselweni and Manzini districts. About 20% of the businesses visited 
were found not to have registered with SRA for tax purposes. These businesses were educated on their compliance 
obligations, furnished with registration forms and advised on the registration process. Following initial engagement with 
these businesses, follow-up visits ensured that they actually registered.  
19  This figure is taken from Schneider and Williams (2013), and is an average value between 1999 and 2006.  
20  This weak performance is also shown in the deteriorating company tax-to-GDP ratio, from 2.7% in 2016/17 to 2.4% in 
2017/18 (SRA 2018).  
21  Additional conditions can be added, as in the case for Eswatini, to these two (necessary) ones. 
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employed individuals).22 For them, nil-filing rates average at about 20 per cent in the same 
three-year period. In another study on VAT in Rwanda, Mascagni et al. (2019b) show that 35 
per cent of VAT returns from July 2016 to June 2017 have both zero VAT on sales and zero 
VAT on purchases. 
 
Overall, it is not clear why the proportion of nil-filers is so high. In an attempt to summarise 
the different possibilities that emerged from discussions with tax practitioners in Africa, the 
following hypotheses can be formulated: 
 
i) Tax evasion from a business hiding its income, but avoiding fines for failure to file. 
Taxpayers of this type may perceive a low enforcement probability and consider the tax 
agency capacity to detect them to be limited. At the same time, they file and are visible to 
the authority, but they are still not paying any tax. 
ii) Given that filing a return is the norm regardless of having actually traded in the period 
(and severe sanctions are often enforced for failing to file), nil-filing could reflect the 
legitimate declaration of a business who registered but is not operating yet, and thus has 
zero income to declare. There are different reasons behind this behaviour. First, a 
registered taxpayer could be waiting to get a trading licence to start operations.23 
However, due to some bureaucratic weaknesses in the process of getting a licence, 
delays in getting a licence usually occur. The newly registered taxpayer is compelled to 
file in the meantime, and nil-filing is the most immediate solution. Second, taxpayers who 
have registered a business to apply for a public tender and are waiting for the result, 
need to nil-file in the meantime. Third, and more in general, newly registered firms may 
just find it harder to be operative. As shown in a study of McKenzie and Paffhausen 
(2018) on 12 developing countries, a firm in its first year is twice as likely to shut down in 
the next year as a five-year-old firm. Tax authorities tend to exacerbate these issues. 
Administrative policies often try to expand their tax net by encouraging registration. While 
the target of enlarging the tax net is reasonable, mass campaigns usually take place and 
translate into unnecessary registrations of a large number of only potential entrepreneurs 
who are most likely to be inoperative. These newly registered taxpayers legitimately file 
nil to be compliant. 
iii) Businesses who ceased operations but are still registered due to the bureaucratic 
complexity of deregistering from the authority records and keep filing nil to avoid 
penalties.24 A taxpayer who wants to deregister from the tax authority has first to 
deregister from government bodies. While deregistering from a tax authority is usually 
free, deregistering from government registry can be costly, as it implies paying all 
outstanding debts taxpayers owe to the government. This complexity is often 
exacerbated by a lack of cooperation between government and revenue authorities, who 
often work in isolation and do not share information to facilitate the deregistration 
process, among other taxpayer services.  
 
A field experiment in Rwanda (Mascagni et al. forthcoming), explicitly targeting nil-filers with 
different messages to test hypothesis (i) and (iii) above, provides useful insight. The authors 
show that targeted nil-filers are more likely to switch to declare a positive amount after 
receiving the deterrence message. Effects are rather small (2% decrease in nil-filing), but 
they provide evidence that part of the issue is due to evasion. Likewise, informing nil-filers 
about the deregistration procedure has a significant effect on the probability of deregistering 
from the revenue authority, even if small in magnitude (just under 1%). Additionally, a simple 
                                                          
22  As a referee correctly suggested, the most important compliance issues with self-employed taxpayers are usually 
informality and non-filing, rather than nil-filing.  
23  While, as is the case in Eswatini, some sectors, i.e. real estate and finance, are exempted from getting a trading licence, 
they are still required to obtain a certain form of trading document from the responsible regulating authority. 
24  From the SRA taxpayers’ registry, we can see that just 3.7% of the total taxpayer population are labelled as 
‘suspended’, i.e. deregistered. All the others are considered to be active. If we compare this figure with the ‘death’ rate 
from 12 developing countries (McKenzie and Paffhausen 2018), which is about 8.3% per year in the first five years, we 
can speculate that not all taxpayers that shut down are actually removed from the registry. 
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reminder about the filing deadline significantly reduces nil-filing by 2 per cent.25 These 
results, taken together, suggest that a large proportion of nil-filers still do not react to 
messages – even if they are being specifically targeted.  
 
 
3  Profile of nil-filers in Eswatini  
 
3.1 Data description 
 
This study mainly relies on administrative data provided by SRA, accessed in September 
2018, as extracted from the authority’s Revenue Management System. The administrative 
data is completely anonymous to ensure that taxpayers could not be identified in any 
possible way.26 Much preliminary work has been done on understanding the key figures in a 
income tax return form, as well as how the information was stored on the SRA platform. 
Additionally, data has been cleaned to better fit the purpose of this analysis.27 More 
specifically, the following sources of data have been used: 
 
i) CIT returns. Declarations lodged in the period 2013-2017. In total, we observe 31,777 
declarations lodged by 9,357 companies. This means that each taxpayer (with a given 
TIN) files on average 4.1 times across the five years, due to the fact that some of them 
registered after 2013 or that they interrupt filing in at least one year.28 The dataset 
contains additional taxpayer’s information, such as administrative district and economic 
sector, which will be used in the heterogeneity analysis. 
ii) VAT returns. VAT declarations are made in the same period as income tax returns. They 
account for 78,916 declarations lodged by 4,029 taxpayers.29 However, this data is at the 
monthly (40% of all returns), quarterly (39%) or yearly (1%) level, given that VAT payers 
have a different filing frequency.30 For this reason, we aggregated the VAT returns at the 
year level, to make the dataset comparable to the one for income tax. 
iii) PAYE reconciliation returns. Available for three years only, 2015-2017. PAYE returns are 
submitted monthly but PAYE reconciliation returns are on annual basis, lodged by the end 
of October of each year. We observe a total of 8,674 declarations lodged by 3,549 
taxpayers. Key figures on PAYE deducted and number of salaried employees declared 
will be derived from this source of data. 
 
The reason for using sources (ii) and (iii) is to merge them with the list of nil-filers from (i). In 
this way, we are able to see whether a nil-filer is also filing nil on their VAT and PAYE 
returns, or whether they are declaring divergent information in different returns, a possible 
indication of misreporting or evasion. 
 
                                                          
25  Even if a direct link is not easy to identify, it could be that, just by sending an SMS, the authority increases the perceived 
likelihood of enforcement for those taxpayers who are evading and now feel more on the agency’s radar. 
26  Instead of using TINs, SRA created random ID numbers to be used as unique identifiers. 
27  Some cleaning of data was necessary. The only relevant cleaning actions refer to the better labelling of the Sector and 
District variables. Only two duplicates (same declaration info for the same TIN in the same year) were found and 
deleted. 
28  Some 38% of taxpayers filed across all 5 years, while only 19% filed in just one year. 
29  The VAT Act requires that any business that supplies goods or services that are not exempt from VAT should apply for 
VAT registration. VAT registration is compulsory for businesses whose annual taxable turnover exceeds SZL500,000. 
National, regional or public institutions (parastatals and municipalities) that make taxable supplies are required to 
register for VAT even though they do not meet the above-mentioned threshold. Businesses supplying only exempt 
goods and services are not required to register. However, where a business supplies both exempt and taxable services, 
that business must register if the total turnover of the taxable supplies meets the annual turnover of SZL500,000. Other 
businesses whose turnover is below the threshold of SZL500,000 may apply for registration if they meet the registration 
requirements and the Commissioner General is satisfied that they are fit and proper to be registered. 
30  VAT payers who file monthly fall above the threshold SZL20 million. VAT payers who file quarterly are smaller, falling 
below the threshold. The remaining 1% filing annually consists of sugar cane companies, which mostly follow seasonal 
fluctuations in production and report transactions once a year. 
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3.2 Profile of nil-filers 
 
In order to identify a nil-filer, we assume a taxpayer as being nil-filing if they report zero in all 
the following information fields: turnover, cost of sales, total income, net taxable income, tax 
assessed and tax payable or refund. The first key figure produced in this exercise is the 
share of nil returns per year. Overall, across the five-year period 2013-2017, the share of nil-
filing is as high as 29 per cent. Almost a third of all income tax returns lodged are nil. Table 1 
below shows the disaggregated extent of nil-filing by year. The trend has been quite stable 
over time, with a significant reduction in the last year, when nil-filing falls by 2.4 percentage 
points from 29.6 per cent in 2016 to 27.2 per cent in 2017. This means an 8 per cent 
decrease in 2017 in relative terms with respect to 2016.31 One reason for the fall in nil-filing 
could be that declarations could still be missing in 2017. Indeed, the total number of returns 
lodged and processed in 2017 is 11 per cent smaller than the number of returns lodged in 
2016, while this number increased every year from 2013. The argument would be that late 
filing is correlated with nil-filing, some evidence of which is anecdotal.32 A further analysis of 
the tax returns data provides a clearer picture of the failure to file in any year under study. 
Appendix Table A2 summarises the share of taxpayers failing to file over the total number of 
taxpayers supposed to be filing. As expected, the share of failure-to-file increases from 2013 
to 2017. While non-filers are 15 per cent in 2013, they amount to 26 per cent in 2017, 
somewhat corroborating the intuition behind the drop of nil-filers in 2017. 
 
Table 1 Share of nil income tax returns 2013-2017 
Submitted 
returns 
Year 
Total 
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Non-nil 3,920 70.7% 
4,379 
70.4% 
4,767 
70.5% 
4,933 
70.4% 
4,545 
72.8% 
22,544 
70.9% 
Nil 1,625 29.3% 
1,840 
29.6% 
1,996 
29.5% 
2,075 
29.6% 
1,695 
27.2% 
9,231 
29.1% 
Total 5,545 6,219 6,763 7,008 6,240 31,775 
Source: authors’ computation on SRA administrative data 
 
A closer inspection of the data provides a clearer picture on nil-filing. First, we can translate 
the share of nil returns in terms of actual taxpayers. As already discussed in section 3.1, the 
average taxpayer files 4.1 times over 5 years, meaning that a taxpayer could be nil-filing 
more than once. Indeed, the share of nil-filing taxpayers over the total number of taxpayers 
filing a return is higher than the 29 per cent reported above. As many as 4,212 uniquely 
identified taxpayers (with unique TINs) nil-filed in at least one year over the period 2013-
2017, or 45 per cent of the total.33 
                                                          
31  This decrease is significant at the 1% level when running a Pearson chi-square test on the equality of trends across 
years (we would consider p-values above 10% to indicate that no statistically significant differences exist across 
groups/years). 
32  Author’s discussion with SRA officials often pointed out that taxpayers who missed declarations for many years and 
wanted to clear their tax position (most likely to get the Tax Clearance Certificate required for certain types of 
transactions, such as buying a vehicle or property), are advised by SRA staff upon being interviewed to file nil for all 
those years for which they have not lodged a return. 
33  Of the 4,212 nil-filers, 5 are classified as exempt from income tax in the SRA database. However, an additional 31 
exempted taxpayers filed positively in the period. We are not sure whether we should remove them since they filed. 
Moreover, the data on exempted firms is scant and possibly not up-to-date. Given the small number of exempted 
taxpayers, their influence is very negligible. We decided to keep them in the analysis. 
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3.3 Nil-filing by district 
 
In order to detect any geographical distribution of nil-filing across Eswatini, it is necessary to 
represent the national figures at the district level. There are four districts in Eswatini – 
Hhohho, Manzini, Lubombo and Shiselwni. The capital city and government headquarters 
are located in Hhohho. Manzini is the most industrial district, where many registered 
businesses are found. More specifically, 88 per cent of all companies’ returns lodged in 
2013-2017 come from either Hhohho (46%) or Manzini (42%), while Lubombo and 
Shiselweni represent a smaller share of the total, 8 per cent and 4 per cent respectively. 
 
Figure 1 shows the trend of nil-filing across years in each district. On the vertical axis, the 
share refers to the percentage of nil returns over the total returns filed within each district. 
 
Figure 1 Share of nil income tax returns by district 2013-2017 
 
 
Some key considerations can be derived from Figure 1. First, Hhohho shows the highest 
share of nil-filing – about 31 per cent for the whole period, a bit higher than the national 
average. Second, Lubombo and Shiselweni have much lower incidence of nil returns in the 
period, 24 per cent and 25 per cent respectively. Third, the economically vibrant district of 
Manzini closely follows the national trend. Lastly, while nil-filing stayed stable over time in 
Hhohho, Lubombo and Manzini, a sizeable drop from 26 per cent in 2014 to 19 per cent in 
2017 took place in Shiselweni.34 
 
More in-depth research should be carried to understand the differential in trends across 
districts. A plausible explanation for the high prevalence of nil-filing in Hhohho could be 
linked to sector-specific dynamics or firm-level characteristics, such as sector or size, as 
shown in the following sections. 
 
                                                          
34  Moreover, Shiselweni is the only district that does not see a reduction in the number of filed returns in 2017 (they are 
actually more than in 2014 and 2015, when nil-filing was much higher), as happens in all the other districts, so signalling 
the absence of late filing. This means that the reduction in nil-filing is not due to late filing, as suggested for the other 
districts. However, the relative importance of this district is minor, given that it represents only 4% of all returns filed in 
Eswatini. 
 14 
3.4 Nil-filing by sector  
 
An interesting question is whether nil-filing is more common in some sectors than others. 
Table 2 below describes the total share of nil returns over the total returns within each sector 
by year.  
 
Table 2 Share of nil income tax returns by sector in 2013-2017 
 
SECTOR 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 25.6%  27.6% 26.7% 26.5% 24.0% 
Construction 35.6% 40.5% 38.6% 39.2% 37.7% 
Finance and insurance 25.8% 25.2% 26.7% 26.5% 21.3% 
Information and Communications Technology (ICT) 38.2% 33.3% 37.9% 34.5% 27.0% 
Manufacturing, mining and quarrying 23.4% 24.2% 21.4% 22.4% 20.2% 
Other service activities 43.3% 39.3% 40.5% 38.8% 35.9% 
Professional, scientific, technical activities 32.6% 30.7% 31.4% 30.6% 27.1% 
Real estate 27.3% 27.9% 30.6% 33.1% 29.4% 
Trade, transport, accommodation and food services 24.4% 26.6% 27.9% 28.4% 24.5% 
Eswatini 29.3% 29.6% 29.5% 29.6% 27.2% 
 
Source: authors’ computation on SRA administrative data 
 
From the table above, it can be seen that three sectors file nil returns much more frequently 
than others: construction, other service activities and ICT. The former two seems to have the 
highest share of nil-filing each year, with peaks at 40 per cent in 2014 for construction and 43 
per cent in 2013 for other service activities. In a few sectors, such as agriculture and finance, 
trends are stable over years, while larger fluctuations take place in other sectors – such as 
ICT and other service activities. However, the same downward trend in nil-filing can be seen 
for all sectors in 2017, as already discussed in section 3.2. 
 
A closer interrogation of reasons for the high prevalence in nil-filing across these three 
sectors is worthwhile. Why is nil-filing more likely to take place in ICT, construction and other 
service activities? Are common explanations for nil-filing, such as no trade or operations in 
the year, more likely to affect these sectors for some structural reason? This result implies 
the need to explore the heterogeneity in nil-filing taking place within the country, not just 
considering the national figures. For example, in an attempt to answer our question about the 
higher extent of nil-filing in Hhohho from section 3.3, it can be seen that taxpayers in other 
service activities are more frequent in Hhohho (12%) with respect to Eswatini as a whole 
(8.6%). Given that ICT and construction sectors in Hhohho are as representative as in the 
country overall, it could be that service activities are partly driving up nil-filing rates in that 
district. 
 
3.5 Nil-filing by size 
 
In this section, a further dimension of heterogeneity is explored: firm’s size. According to 
SRA data, firms are classified as either small and medium enterprise (SME) or large, mostly 
based on turnover.35 SMEs represent the vast majority of filing firms 2013-2017 – 97.8 per 
cent, or 9,139 unique firms. Large taxpayers are just 205 in total.  
                                                          
35  There is no specific threshold to classify what are SMEs or large enterprises; instead an 80:20 revenue rule-of-thumb is 
observed. Usually, all financial institutions, mobile operators, mining and textile companies with high PAYE are large. 
Most often, the Commissioner General assigns the status of large at his discretion. 
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Figure 2 below shows the varying prevalence of nil-filing by firm size. Nil-filing is much more 
common for SMEs, where on average about 30 per cent nil-file per year. Nil-filing for large 
firms ranges between 5 and 7 per cent, with a peak of 10 per cent in 2016. These figures 
confirm that SMEs are driving the national average of nil-filing of about 29 per cent. As an 
additional consideration, it may seem counterintuitive that a large firm nil-files. However, it 
could well be that these firms are classified as large by the authority at the time of 
registration or the initial years of operation, and could end up nil-filing in following years. To 
confirm this, it could be noted that 83 per cent of the 205 large firms in the sample registered 
before 2013. It is plausible that, despite being large initially, they nil-file as they stop being 
operational or for another reason. 
 
Figure 2 Share of nil income tax returns by size in 2013-2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There are several reasons why nil-filing is much more common for SMEs. First, large firms 
are expected to be operational due to their size, which allows them to be more competitive 
and to access financial markets more easily. SMEs are more prone to be not trading in a 
given year due to financial constraints. As shown in section 5, the qualitative desk exercise 
shows that lack of trade is the main reason for nil-filing. Second, large firms are likely to have 
more rigorous bookkeeping procedures, and can afford to hire highly skilled external tax 
advisers to assist with filing a return. Third, related to the latter point, filing a tax return for 
larger firms would seem to be a more serious obligation as they are always on the radar of 
the tax authority. Nil-filing from large firms would almost automatically trigger an audit. SMEs 
are much less likely to be detected for suspicious reporting behaviour due to their high 
numbers on the tax register, and they might be aware of this. As a result, they might 
internalise a lower perceived risk of being caught, and nil-file more often. In this case, the 
argument that evasion is the main reason for nil-filing is more credible.  
 
From a policy point of view, the fact that the vast majority of nil-filers are SMEs should help 
the authority predict that the possible extra revenue that can be raised by targeting them 
could be small. However, this does not mean that this issue should be considered 
unimportant. If nil-filing is also driven by evasion, curbing it could bring other non-monetary 
benefits to SRA and to society as a whole – such as a greater perception of fairness in the 
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community of taxpayers, where everyone pays the taxes they owe, fewer economic 
distortions between competing businesses, less inequality, as well as, more broadly, a 
strengthened culture of compliance.  
 
3.6 Nil-filing by length of business’ life 
 
As a final check on the heterogeneity of nil-filers, we were interested in detecting any 
different behaviour according to length of the business’ life. It could be that nil-filing is a 
specific response for businesses of a given age. For this reason, we split the sample of 
taxpayers in two groups: those that are new – in the first year of declaration after registration, 
and those that are old – in the second year after registration or later. Appendix Figure A2 
shows the percentage of nil-filing by the two groups. It seems that nil-filing is much more 
common in the first year after registration, in which taxpayers are 46 per cent likely to file nil, 
rather than when they are in the second year or more (26%). The difference between the two 
groups is statistically significant with a p-value of the Chi-square test of 0 per cent.36 This 
tells us that nil-filing is correlated with the age of the business. A plausible explanation could 
be that firms in their first year are not yet operative, and could be legitimately nil-filing for this 
reason (see section 2). This is also related to some contemporaneous evidence on the fact 
that younger firms are more likely to die, especially during the first year (McKenzie and 
Paffhausen 2018).  
 
A relevant concern that emerges when using the year of registration in the analysis is that 
this information may not be sufficiently reliable. SRA is still devoting much of its resources to 
the cleansing of the taxpayers’ registry, and the process has not yet been completed. For this 
reason, as an alternative measure for business’ life length, we look at the number of years 
for which the taxpayers filed a return, a variable that ranges from one to five (every year in 
the reference period). This information is not extracted from the registry, is more likely to be 
accurate, and could possibly proxy the life length of the business. When disaggregating the 
share of nil returns by the numbers of years of filing, a similar picture emerges: submitting a 
nil return is much more likely to take place for businesses with just a year of filing, 58 per 
cent, vis à vis businesses with five years of filing, 18 per cent. The probability of observing a 
nil return decreases when the number of years move from one to five.37 
 
This last finding adds to the diversified picture of nil-filing behaviour described in the previous 
sections. 
 
3.7 A more structured approach 
 
While in the previous subsections we map the patterns of nil-filing in a descriptive way, in this 
subsection we present a more robust solution to identify those patterns. We adopt a 
regression approach, in which we regress an indicator variable for a nil return in a given year 
on a set of descriptive variables of the company in that same year. This set of variables is 
composed of district, sector, size and business’ life length, which, in this setting, may be 
referred to as explanatory variables. This is exactly the same information studied above, but 
presented here in a way to obtain more robust estimates of the correlations lying behind this 
filing behaviour. 
 
                                                          
36  In this case, the Chi-square test is used to determine whether there is a significant difference between the expected 
frequencies and the observed frequencies of nil-filing in the two groups - i.e. taxpayers in their first year of declarations 
and taxpayers in their second year or more. In the absence of any different reporting behaviour between the two groups, 
the expected frequencies should be the same in the groups. However, this is not the case. A p-value lower than the 5% 
significance level implies a strongly significant difference of nil-filing between the two groups. 
37  Table omitted for brevity. The share of nil returns for firms with 2 years of filing is 47%, with 3 years is 43%, and with 4 
years is 35%. 
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Appendix Table A3 reports the results. In column 1, a simple multivariate OLS regression is 
adopted, while in columns 2 and 3 probit and logit estimates are provided. Estimates do not 
provide a causal link, but should rather be looked at as indicating a correlation with nil-filing. 
Results are quite similar to those presented in the subsections above. Nil-filing is more likely 
to take place in Hhohho and Manzini rather than Lubombo (Shilselweni omitted), as in 
section 3.3. Likewise, nil returns are more frequent in construction, other service activities, 
ICT and professionals, as explained in section 3.4 (Table 2), and least likely to take place in 
public administration. Moreover, a strong negative correlation can be noticed between nil-
filing and the size of the firm, as in section 3.5. Finally, firms at their first year after 
registration are much more likely to file nil. Similarly, the number of years with filing is 
negatively related to nil-filing, as emerged from section 3.6. 
 
3.8 Persistent nil-filers 
 
Here, in an attempt to dig deeper in the nil-filing issue, we restrict the analysis to the so-
called persistent nil-filers. Persistent nil-filers are taxpayers who nil-file every year in which 
they file a return. While a nil-filer, as defined in the previous sections, is filing nil in at least 
one year over the five-year period, and could positively file in any other year, persistent nil-
filers nil-file every time they file. 
 
The extent of persistent nil-filers can be summarised as follows: 
 
• 29.6 per cent of all taxpayers filing in the period 2013-2017 are persistently nil-filing. This 
amounts to 2,749 unique taxpayers out of a total of 9,357 (see section 3.2).38 
• With respect to the broader definition of nil-filer from section 3.2, according to which 4,212 
taxpayers were nil-filing in at least one year – 66 per cent of them are persistent nil-filers. 
A nil-filer in Eswatini has two-thirds probability of persistently nil-filing. 
• Cascading down this analysis to those taxpayers who filed in at least two years, to 
consider persistent nil-filers over a minimum period of two years,39 the share slightly 
decreases: persistent nil-filers are 23 per cent of the total number of filing taxpayers (down 
from 29.6%) and 54 per cent of the sample of non-persistent nil-filers (down from 66%). 
 
When making a further comparison, the heterogeneity analysis of persistent nil-filers yields 
very similar results to the one on nil-filers only. More specifically: 
 
• By district: Hhohho has the highest share of persistent nil-filers over the total number of 
filing taxpayers, 31 per cent, while Shiselweni has the lowest, 23 per cent, similar to what 
is shown in section 3.3.40 
• By sector: in construction (38%), other service activities (38%) and ICT (37%) persistent 
nil-filers are a higher percentage of the total number of filers, similar to what is shown in 
section 3.4.41 
                                                          
38  Even if the results are remarkably similar, the share of persistent taxapyers is not to be confused with the 29% nil-filing 
rate as an annual average over the period 2013-2017 (see section 3.2). We are expressing persistent nil-filing in terms 
of the number of taxpayers, not on an annual basis. Given that persistent nil-filers are nil-filing in any year, it makes 
more sense to look at the overall population of filing taxpayers than the annual average.  
39  In this case, we do not consider a taxpayer who files in only one year, possibly because they are newly registered, as a 
persistent nil-filer. We also do not show results disaggregated by ‘new’ and ‘old’ taxpayers, since, in this analysis, 
taxpayers are all beyond their first year after registration. 
40  The corresponding figures for the subsample of filers for at least two consecutive fiscal years is: Hhohho 20%, Manzini 
18%, Lubombo 15% and Shiselweni 12%. These figures exclude those taxayers who registered in 2017 and were found 
to submit nil returns in the same year. 
41  The corresponding figures for the subsample of filers for at least two fiscal years are: construction 23%, other service 
activities 26% and ICT 21%. 
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• By size: similarly to what is described in section 3.5, SMEs are much more likely to be 
persistently nil-filing (30%) than large taxpayers (12%), as a share of the total number of 
filers.42 
4  What are nil-filers reporting in other tax 
returns?  
 
In the previous section, the extent of nil-filing has been quantified in a total of 4,212 
taxpayers who filed a nil tax return in a given year over the past five years (2013-2017). The 
next step is to determine whether these nil-filers are making a true declaration – if this is 
consistent with what the taxpayer reports in other tax returns.  
 
The basis of this section therefore is to prove legitimacy of the captured nil income tax 
declaration by merging income tax returns data with other tax types (VAT, PAYE) that the 
same taxpayer is registered for. In this way, we can compare the information submitted on 
different tax types by the same taxpayer in the same year. Subsequently, discrepancies 
across different tax returns can be mapped. Where a taxpayer who is nil-filing in their income 
tax return is found to have positive transactions for either VAT or PAYE, it could be argued 
that the nil income tax return submitted during that year is not justified. Concerns of 
misreporting and tax evasion come into play. 
 
4.1 Nil-filers with transactions for VAT  
 
Over the past five years, it was found that 449 from a total of 4,212 income tax nil-filers had 
declared VAT in the year that they filed a nil return (10.7%). This corresponds to 724 CIT 
annual returns for which a VAT declaration can be found in the same year. A closer analysis 
of these returns produces the following results: 
 
• 436 (60%) report zero supplies in the VAT declaration, somewhat in line with their nil 
business income in the CIT return.  
• 288 (40%) report positive supplies with an average amount of SZL26 million ($1.8 million). 
The sum of these supplies amounts to SZL7.46 billion ($532 million). 
• Similarly, of the 724 CIT nil returns for which a VAT declaration is found, 432 (59.6%) 
consistently report zero VAT payable or refundable, 237 (33%) declared a positive VAT 
payable of SZL1.19 million ($85,000) on average; 55 (7.5%) are in a refund position for an 
average of SZL1.78 million ($127,000). 
 
Considering the fact that a nil-filer could file a VAT return multiple times over the reference 
peiod, the figure of 288 VAT returns with positive supplies reported above refers to 236 
unique nil-filers. These taxpayers should not have submitted a nil return and are therefore 
reporting divergent information to the authority. It is also worth noticing that this group of 
taxpayers is a small share of the nil-filing sample, just 5.6 per cent. The remaining nil-filers 
do not flag any concern of blatant evasion. Most of them (about 90%) are not even declaring 
a VAT return. This could be due to the fact that they did not trade (section 1.2), but it could 
also be that they are aware that reporting discordant information to the authority could 
increase the risk of an audit. It could also be due to the fact that the majority of nil-filers are 
not VAT-registered, something that we cannot observe with the available data. At the same 
time, 60 per cent of those taxpayers filing VAT returns while nil-filing in their income tax 
return consistently report zero supplies in the VAT form. This could reflect both a virtuous 
filing behaviour, where the taxpayer declares VAT regardless of whether he is operating or 
not, but, at the same time, could mean that the taxpayer is evading on both returns. It is very 
                                                          
42  The corresponding figures for the subsample of filers for at least two consecutive fiscal years are: SMEs 23%, large 5%. 
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difficult to disentangle the different mechanisms that could explain this pattern. What we 
could state with certainty is that the 236 nil-filers reporting positive sales in the VAT returns 
show a concerning behaviour most likely to be considered as tax evasion. 
4.2 Nil-filers with transactions for PAYE 
 
In the same way as in section 4.1, here we merge the nil-filers sample with the PAYE returns 
data for the year 2015-2017. As explained in section 3.1, only a restricted period is available 
for the PAYE data – 3,272 unique nil-filers can be identified in 2015-2017, as opposed to the 
larger sample of 4,212 in 2013-2017. When merging with PAYE data, we notice that 164 nil-
filers are declaring PAYE (5%) or 3.4 per cent of the total returns in the period 2015-2017. 
Focusing on this subsample of 164 PAYE-declaring income tax nil-filers, we can realise that: 
 
• 37 per cent report zero employees, while 63 per cent indicate a positive number of 
salaried employees. The average number of employees reported is 31, with an average 
total taxable salary of SZL2.8 million ($198,000).43 In sum, 106 nil-filers are reporting 
salaried employees in the year in which they nil-filed. 
• In the same way, while 48 per cent report zero PAYE deducted, 24 per cent have positive 
PAYE deducted and 28 per cent are in a refund position. The average PAYE deducted is 
SZL4,884 ($348),44 while the average PAYE refunded is SZL3,336 ($238). 
 
Again, discrepancies in the information declared to the authority with different tax returns 
signal the possibility of evasion taking place. However, when considering the absolute 
numbers, the extent of misreporting with PAYE data is not substantial. There are only 106 
income tax nil-filers who report positive salaries, or 3 per cent of the nil-filing sample. 
Nevertheless, these taxpayers should not have reported nil taxable income, even with zero 
turnover. More correctly, they should be in a loss position, with a negative taxable income. 
Moreover, these findings beg the question of where the income to pay the salaried 
employees was taken from, if they declared nil in the submitted tax return of that year. The 
vast majority of nil-filers did not file any PAYE return or, if so, reported to have zero 
employees. As mentioned above, this could either be due to proper filing behaviour or to tax 
avoidance and evasion on both income and PAYE taxes.  
 
4.3 Nil-filers with transactions for both VAT and PAYE 
 
As a final check, we consider nil-filers declaring both VAT and PAYE and observe the 
resulting discrepancy, if any. Not surprisingly, there are very few nil-filers reporting both VAT 
and PAYE – 90 in total. They amount to 20 per cent of nil-filers declaring VAT, and 55 per 
cent of those declaring PAYE. Of these, 54 (60%) report divergent information with respect to 
their income tax returns – positive supplies in the VAT declaration and positive salaries in the 
PAYE returns. 
 
Despite this being a fairly negligible share, a certain trend of misreporting in the way 
taxpayers make their declarations is visible. From the above findings, it is therefore safe to 
say that not all the observed nil-filers in the system are actually nil-filers in the true sense. It 
is somewhat reassuring to notice that these numbers are not high. Nevertheless, they do call 
for caution and the need to respond before the gap widens. 
 
 
5  Additional qualitative evidence on nil-filing  
                                                          
43  The number of salaried employees is derived from the PAYE returns and not from the taxpayer registration profile. 
While in these profiles taxpayers indicate the number of employees at the time of registration, they update that number 
every time they file a PAYE reconciliation return. This means that the figures above reflect the actual number of 
employees in that given year, not the one at the time of registration. 
44  Mostly driven down by very small amounts. The first quartile (25%) amounts to an annual PAYE deducted of $2.6 only.  
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In the specific context under study, in addition to administrative data some qualitative 
evidence can be easily gathered that may help decipher the issue of nil-filing. Indeed, in 
Eswatini it is a mandatory requirement for a taxpayer to attach an official letter to the nil 
income tax return justifying the reason for submitting a nil return.45 We selected a random 
sample of 50 nil-filing companies in 2017 and coded the reasons for this behaviour.46 It 
results that: 
 
o The main reason for all 50 nil-filers is that they are not operational. 
o The reason why they are not operational is not always specified. A few nil-filers clearly 
state the main challenges they faced and why they became inoperative. 
o The key challenge is related to lack of funds and unpredictable financial constraints 
(16%). 
o Other challenges refer to management disagreement, failure to find an office to work in, or 
health issues of the business’ owner. 
o About 10 per cent say the business has not been running for several years.47  
 
In summary, most of the nil-filers are simply not in operation, or at least report that this is the 
case. It can be also noticed that 40 per cent of the sample registered before 2013,48 while the 
remaining 60 per cent registered in the following years, in a pretty uniform manner. This 
implies that nil-filing could be a common problem regardless of the length of the firms’ life. 
 
Additional qualitative evidence comes from the authors’ discussions with seven SRA staff.49 
It emerges that nil-filing could be the result of a process in which taxpayers rationally 
maximise the benefits of exploiting internal loopholes within the tax system. According to the 
tax code there are no penalties applicable for submitting a nil return, even if it is past the 
filing deadline. For this reason and subsequent to engagement with SRA, taxpayers are often 
‘advised’ by SRA officials to submit a nil return in order to prove to be compliant with tax 
obligations and clear their tax position. This usually happens when the taxpayer needs to 
obtain a tax clearance certificate, which is a mandatory requirement in most business 
spheres in the country. The feeling among SRA’s staff is that taxpayers are maximising this 
loophole and probably sharing information about it as a simple means of avoiding paying 
taxes and penalties, but still being in a legitimate position with respect to the authority. 
 
 
6  Concluding remarks  
 
In this study, SRA and ICTD aim to describe and measure the extent of nil-filing among 
corporate income tax filers. Nil-filing is a widespread compliance issue in many economies in 
sub-Saharan Africa (Rwanda, Uganda and Ethiopia) and is a largely under-researched topic. 
Very little is known of the reasons why a large proportion of registered taxpayers report nil 
returns, often for many consecutive years. The same revenue authorities focus little attention 
on those declarations that do not yield a positive revenue base, and it seems to be difficult to 
design proper revenue-generating strategies targeting a behaviour that is not well 
understood. 
 
                                                          
45  To our knowledge, this attachment is not required in other ICTD partner countries, such as Rwanda. 
46  Randomisation was performed using STATA statistical software. 
47  This finding is linked to the discussion on persistent nil-filers in the previous section. 
48  We aggregate all registrations before 2013 in a single group, since information on the registration date before 2013 is 
more likely to be inaccurate. 
49  SRA staff were from Field Service, Central Operations and Compliance Divisions. They were not randomly selected or 
sampled in any rigorous way. 
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After accessing anonymised CIT returns for the period 2013-2017, we have been able to 
map the extent of nil-filing in the country. Results show that nil-filing is not a minor issue in 
Eswatini. On average as many as 29 per cent of CIT returns are nil in the last five years. This 
translates to 45 per cent of filing taxpayers who nil-file in at least one year. A more in-depth 
analysis of the data has been run in order to measure the heterogeneity patterns across key 
taxpayers’ characteristics, such as location, economic sector and size. Nil-filing is not a 
homogenous behaviour: in Hhohho, nil-filing rates are higher than the national average, while 
in Shiselweni they are at their lowest. Simiarly, three key sectors – construction, ICT and 
other service activities – show a much higher presence of nil-filers, about 40 per cent of 
yearly returns. These are also the sectors that show a sharp decrease in revenue collection 
in 2017/2018, as reported in SRA (2018). At the same time, small firms are six times more 
likely to nil-file than large ones. Equally important, the issue of persistent nil-filing is explored. 
A sizeable 30 per cent of all taxpayers filing in the five-year period are persistently nil-filing. 
In line with this finding, it is also shown that two-thirds of nil-filers are persistent ones. This 
suggests that nil-filing could be a well-established filing behaviour that persists over time. 
 
With the evidence emerging from this study, it is important to ponder the initial question 
prompted by this paper. As a revenue administration, how well does SRA understand the 
way taxpayers in Eswatini are declaring their income, and what is being done to improve this 
understanding? Obtaining appropriate responses to this question will enable the 
development of innovative solutions to meet the strategic vision for SRA, expressed by the 
‘100% voluntary compliance for a better Eswatini’ plan. SRA needs to comprehend fully the 
triggers that make taxpayers nil-file, and this requires a sound understanding of the way 
taxpayers behave and how they respond to different situations.  
 
Building on the results presented, some key policy recommendations can be formulated. 
First, on a more general level, the ongoing improvement on the taxpayers’ registry is 
welcomed in order to have a cleaner database to be analysed in further research. During this 
study, some issues have been experienced in the correct understanding of the profiles of 
different taxpayers in the database, and SRA realised how crucial it is to ensure that those 
taxpayers who appear in the registry are those who should be in the tax system. According to 
SRA, a key step in cleaning and improving the database would be the exchange of business 
registration information with the government counterpart who usually has separate registries 
for specific taxpayers.50  
 
Second, several recommendations can be made regarding the way the tax authority could 
cope with nil-filing. The large number of nil-filers found in this study can encourage SRA to 
put more effort into establishing a dedicated intelligence unit with the role of monitoring 
compliance. A proper monitoring system could be set up, to automatically gather figures on 
nil-filing to be shared to inform the policy discourse.51 Likewise, the system could 
systematically cross-check different tax returns for the same taxpayer and trigger audits 
when inconsistencies are detected, in much the same way as has been done in this study. A 
key requirement would be to dedicate resources and skilled staff to this task. Moreover, 
physical inspections for a sample could be done for those nil-filers who own well-known 
properties (see section 5). Finally, given the qualitative evidence that nil-filing is often a 
solution for missed declarations and late filing (see section 5), the income tax law could be 
refined with harsher penalties for late filing being introduced, regardless of whether the 
taxpayers brings a nil return. A stricter tax code could improve the general compliance 
                                                          
50  At the time of writing this report there is no systematic linkage with the government business registration database, 
which would allow the SRA to view the total number of businesses registered in a timely fashion. The same lack of 
interface refers to information on trading licence renewal, deregistrations from the government registry and those 
businesses that are dormant. 
51  Authors’ discussion with SRA officials show that the internal revenue management system is not configured to track 
persistent nil-filers. Ad hoc reports on nil-filers are produced on a monthly basis, but the monitoring and feedback 
mechanism to Operations Department is still very weak.  
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behaviour and reduce nil-filing as a way to exploit the existing internal loopholes.  
 
Third, SRA and ICTD aim to build on the evidence gathered in this study and to implement a 
large-scale field experiment in the country. Using rigorous methods and sampling strategies, 
such as randomised controlled trials, the aim of both partners’ is to test cost-effective 
strategies to reduce nil-filing in Eswatini. Different hypotheses could be tested by simply 
nudging taxpayers with messages varying both in content and delivery methods. Ideally, a 
cheap SMS with the right content – even a simple reminder to file on time – could have an 
immediate impact (Manoli and Turner 2014). Similarly to what has been done in Rwanda 
(Mascagni et al. 2017), SRA could contact nil-filers with different types of message, such as 
a deterrent letter, a brochure with information on deregistration procedures, or a simple 
reminder, and then measure the effectiveness of each message in reducing nil-filing and 
increasing revenue raised. For example, given initial qualitative evidence showing that nil-
filers are likely not to be trading, a message informing them of the deregistration procedure 
would increase the deregistration rates and reduce nil-filing for those who ceased 
operations.52 At the same time, if we expect that some evasion is taking place through nil-
filing, as shown from cross-checking different tax returns for the same nil-filer (section 3), a 
pure deterrence message would help reduce nil-filing by increasing the perceived probability 
of audit and sanctions, as implied by the neoclassical literature (Allingham and Sadmo 1972). 
In so doing, SRA could signal to taxpayers that it has the infrastructural capacity to monitor 
compliance and check for different tax returns at the same time.  
 
Significantly, much evidence has been produced on the effectiveness of deterrence in 
improving compliance (Slemrod et al. 2001; Castro and Scartascini 2015; Fellner et al. 2013; 
Ariel 2012; Bott et al. 2014; Dwenger et al. 2015), with the caveat that the threat of audits 
may be ineffective if enforcement strategies are perceived to be weak and not credible by the 
evading taxpayer (Carrillo et al. 2017). Additionally, an alternative softer approach could also 
be used in addressing nil-filers, for example leveraging on their tax morale (Luttmer and 
Singhal 2014) – even if evidence from existing studies on the impact of this is somewhat 
mixed.53 A softer approach could also show another face of the revenue authority to 
taxpayers: from qualitative interviews with five economic sector representatives, it seems that 
taxpayers feel there is a lack of reciprocity and collaboration with the authority. This also 
includes the SRA’s hostile approach of extracting revenue with minimal investment on 
targeted and intensive taxpayer education, or even informing how taxes are used.  
 
In conclusion, many avenues to tackle nil-filing can potentially be explored, thus contributing 
to the growing literature on tax experiments in the developing world (Mascagni 2016). From a 
broader perspective, further rigorous research can be started considering tax compliance in 
its multidimensionality – for example, including the issue of failing to file or the possibility of 
evading for positive, non-nil-filing, taxpayers.54 This descriptive paper represents only the first 
step in a long-term plan of research collaboration between SRA and ICTD, and fruitful and 
exciting discussions on future research are currently ongoing.  
                                                          
52  In an unpublished study in Rwanda, Mascagni et al. (forthcoming) finds that a reminder is quite effective in pushing 
taxpayers to deregister. 
53  Some studies find that improved tax morale brings more compliance (Hallsworth et al. 2014; Bott et al. 2014), while 
others fail to find any effect (Dwenger et al. 2015; Slemrod et al. 2001; Castro and Scartascini 2015; Fellner et al. 2013).  
54  A parallel study to this seeks to quantify the extent of taxpayers failing to file by the deadline, which will be most likely 
included in a single, multi-faceted, cross-country experiment. 
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Appendix  
 
 
Table A1 Corporate income tax 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SRA, 2018. 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SRA (2018). 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2 Share of non-filers in 2013-2017 
 
Year 
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Non-filers 505 776 1,080 1,495 1,941 
Expected filers 3,316 4,403 5,395 6,521 7,467 
% Non-filers 15% 18% 20% 23% 26% 
Source: authors’ computation on SRA administrative data 
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Table A3 Determinants of nil-filing 
 OLS Probit Logit 
    
Hhohho 0.0634*** 
(4.73) 
0.0712*** 
(4.81) 
0.0722*** 
(4.76) 
Lubombo 0.000627 
(0.04) 
0.00255 
(0.15) 
0.00390 
(0.22) 
Manzini 0.0431** 
(3.22) 
0.0495*** 
(3.34) 
0.0504*** 
(3.31) 
Agriculture -0.0319 
(-1.31) 
0.0200 
(1.61) 
0.0211 
(1.68) 
Construction 0.0534* 
(2.33) 
0.107*** 
(12.75) 
0.106*** 
(12.83) 
Finance -0.0686** 
(-2.76) 
-0.0153 
(-1.11) 
-0.0163 
(-1.16) 
ICT 0 
(.) 
0.0563* 
(2.42) 
0.0567* 
(2.46) 
Manufacturing -0.0704** 
(-3.01) 
-0.0226* 
(-2.18) 
-0.0231* 
(-2.17) 
Other service activities 0.0579* 
(2.48) 
0.111*** 
(11.64) 
0.109*** 
(11.58) 
Professional  -0.0188 
(-0.82) 
0.0365*** 
(4.41) 
0.0359*** 
(4.32) 
Public admin -0.112*** 
(-4.34) 
-0.0630*** 
(-3.88) 
-0.0668*** 
(-3.95) 
Real estate activities 0.00815 
(0.35) 
0.0633*** 
(6.34) 
0.0641*** 
(6.43) 
Trade -0.0521* 
(-2.35) 
0 
(.) 
0 
(.) 
Large -0.181* 
(-2.47) 
-0.292*** 
(-3.73) 
-0.311*** 
(-4.11) 
SME -0.0550 
(-0.77) 
-0.0488 
(-0.65) 
-0.0508 
(-0.72) 
1st year after reg 0.0855*** 
(11.85) 
0.0808*** 
(11.27) 
0.0777*** 
(11.01) 
# of years with filing -0.0908*** 
(-42.51) 
-0.0862*** 
(-39.82) 
-0.0839*** 
(-39.44) 
Constant 0.682*** 
(8.90) 
 
 
 
 
Observations 31349 31349 31349 
t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. The district of Shiselweni is omitted. The dependent variable is an 
indicator variable that takes value 1 if the firm submitted a nil return. Coefficients from Probit and Logit are marginal effects 
computed at mean of covariates. 
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Figure A1 Revenue collection in SZL ’000 and revenue growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SRA, 2018. 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SRA, 2018. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SRA (2018). 
 
 
 
Figure A2 – Nil-filing by length of business’ life 
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